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INTRODUCTION

In 2011, Manssor Arbabsiar along with several members of the Iran
based Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force, planned to
assassinate the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United States. They
attempted to hire members of Los Zetas, a Mexican drug trafficking
organization, to detonate a bomb at a restaurant in Washington, D.C.

University of Miami, J.D. Candidate, May 2016. I would like to Professor Dragnich
for all her help in bringing this article to fruition.
JOHN ROLLINS & LIANA SUN WYLER, Cong. Research Serv. R41004, TERRORISM
AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME: FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 9
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where the Ambassador would be dining. 2 From May to July 2011,
Arbabsiar traveled to Mexico and met with a confidential informant of
the United States Drug Enforcement Agency whom Arbabsiar believed
to be a member of Los Zetas.3 Arbabsiar inquired as to the informant's
knowledge of explosives and explained that he was also interested,
among other things, in attacking an embassy of Saudi Arabia.4 Both men
agreed that the assassination would be handled first and that they would
later execute the other attacks.
As part of the bombing plot, Arbabsiar planned to use the members
of the Los Zetas cartel to bomb the Saudi Arabian and Israeli embassies
in Washington.6 The plot also included a side deal to ship several tons of
opium from the Middle East to Mexico. Arbabsiar was arrested on
October 17, 2012, and pleaded guilty to three major felonies.' The DEA
Administrator, Michele Leonhart, spoke out following Arbabsiar's arrest
and warned that "the dangerous connection between drug trafficking and
terrorism cannot be overstated." 9
Former Attorney General, Eric Holder confirmed that the foiled plot
was directed and approved by elements of the Iranian government and
senior members of the Quds Force.'o Iran's Quds Force is known to
sponsor terrorist activity abroad, and the U.S. Treasury Department
designated the organization to the Foreign Terrorist Organization list for
providing material support to the Taliban and other terrorist
organizations in 2007." The 2011 incident involving Manssor Arbabsiar
has not been the only time that the United States has seen Islamic
organizations interacting with Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations
("MDTOs").

Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Man Pleads Guilty in New York to Conspiring with
Iranian Military Officials to Assassinate Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States
(Oct. 17, 2012) available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/October/12-ag1251 .html (commenting on drug trafficking connection with assassination plot).
3
Id.
4
Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Two Men Charged in Alleged Plot to Assassinate
Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States (Oct.11, 2011) available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-men-charged-alleged-plot-assassinate-saudi-arabianambassador-united-states).
5
Id.
6
Rollins, supra note 1, at 9.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Rollins, supra note 1.
to Benjamin Weiser, Mansour ArbabsiarSentenced for Plot to Kill Saudi Ambassador,
N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/31/nyregion/mansourarbabsiar-sentenced-for-plot-to-kill-saudi-ambassador.html?r-0.
i
Dep't of Justice, supranote 4.
2
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Although MDTOs and terrorist organizations operate differently,
dangerous partnerships have begun to form between the two. The United
Nations estimates that the revenue generated by the drug trade in the
areas of Mexico, the U.S., and Canada is roughly $147 billion annually.12
Terrorist groups require a source of revenue to initiate and carry out their
plans, and the billions of dollars generated by the illicit drug trade in
Mexico has caught their attention. United States intelligence has reported
that more than forty Foreign Terrorist Organizations 3 ("FTOs") have
links to the drug trade.1 4 "Hezbollah, the Taliban, the Zetas, and a host of
other transnational criminal groups play interlocking roles in a global
network of mutually supporting commercial exchanges, by means of
which they fund and replenish each other's treasuries and armories." 5
The emerging relationship between Mexican drug trafficking
organizations and Islamic terrorist organizations presents a major
national security threat to the United States today. In response to this
rapidly growing collaboration, Congressman Michael McCaul has
introduced legislation seeking to designate six MDTOs as FTOs.
According to McCaul, "[the] designation would allow the United States
to limit cartels' financial, property and travel interests, and to impose
harsher punishment on anyone who provides material support to
cartels."1 6 When classified as FTOs by the State Department, MDTOs
would be subject to stricter penalties, and U.S. agencies would have
more tools to limit their influence.' 7
This Note highlights the potential negative repercussions of the
proposed FTO designation and instead suggests that the United States
more effectively utilize existing narcotics trafficking regulations under
Iran, Hezbollah and the Threat to the Homeland: HearingBefore the H Comm. On
Homeland Security H.
Comm.
on Homeland
Security,
112
Cong.
6
https://homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony-Braun.pdf (March 21, 2012) (Statement of
Michael A. Braun DEA Chief of Operations).
13
The Foreign Terrorist Organization list is a way in which the U.S. identifies foreign
governments and organizations that engage in, support, or facilitate terrorism throughout
the world. More information regarding the FTO list is available at: Eileen M. Decker,
The Enemies List: The Foreign Terrorist Organization List and its Role in Defining
Terrorism (March, 2014) (unpublished masters thesis, Naval Postgraduate School),
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=753810 [hereinafter "Decker"].
14
Rollins, supranote 1, at 3.
15
Joel Hernandez, Terrorism, Drug Trafficking, and the Globalization of Supply, 7
12

PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM,

41, 42 (August 2013), http://www.terrorismanalysts.

com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/281/568.
16
Press Release, Congressman Michael McCaul, McCaul Seeks to Classify Mexican
Drug Cartels as Terrorists (Mar. 30, 2011), https://mccaul.house.gov/media-center/pressreleases/mccaul-seeks-to-classify-mexican-drug-cartels-as-terrorists
[hereinafter "Press
Release, Congressman McCaul"].
1
Id.
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the Kingpin Act, and counterterrorism laws under Title 21 of the U.S.
Code to combat the developing narco-terrorism threat. Part II of this
Note explores the emerging relationship between MDTOs and FTOs and
details specific collaboration plots that have raised red flags. Part III,
analyzes the statutory criteria and legal requirements for an FTO
designation, and tests the characteristics of MDTOs under the FTO
designation statute. The note examines the potential legal implications of
the designation, and argues that a designation should not occur. Part IV
concludes the Note and suggests that the United States focus on existing
narcotics trafficking regulations, under the Kingpin Act, and
counterterrorism laws, under Title 21 of the U.S. Code, to fight the
evolving narco-terrorism threat.

II.

THE EMERGING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MDTOs AND

FTOs
The Department of Homeland Security has recently been forced to
face the issue of how the United States should address the emerging
relationship between MDTOs and FTOs. Traditionally, the Department
has treated MDTOs similar to criminal organizations, and has mostly left
the issue in the hands of law enforcement. However, in recent years,
MDTOs have been increasing their violence and now use tactics similar
to those of FTOs.' 9 From 2007 through 2013 there were more than
70,000 drug trafficking-related deaths in Mexico.2 0 Of even more
concern for the United States is the enhanced ability of FTOs to use their
relationships and growing presence in the Western Hemisphere to partner
with deadly MDTOs. Different Islamic actors looking for monetary and
tactical support are approaching MDTOs, and this has led the
Department of Homeland Security to reevaluate their strategy.21 U.S.
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, along with others, has made

S.

Cong. Research Serv. RS21049, MEXICO: ORGANIZED CRIME AND
2 (July 22, 2015), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs
/row/R41576.pdf [hereinafter "Beittel"].
19
Id.
20
MARK P. SULLIVAN & JUNE S. BEITTEL, Cong. Research Serv. RS21049,
LATIN
AMERICA: TERRORISM ISSUES 2 (Aug. 15, 2014), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror
/RS21049.pdf.
21
See generally A Line in the Sand: Countering Crime, Violence and Terror at the
Southwest Border: Hearing before the Subcomm. on oversight, investigations and mgmt,
112 Cong. (Nov, 2012).
is

JUNE

DRUG

BEITTEL,

TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS
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repeated calls to congress to update the United States' foreign policy in
Mexico. In 2011 the Florida Republican said: 22
We must stop looking at the drug cartels today solely from a lawenforcement perspective and consider designating these narco-trafficking
members as foreign terrorist organizations and their leaders as specially
designated nationals if they are providing material support and assistance
to other foreign terrorist organizations and especially designated
nationals and their state sponsors.23
It is no secret that the United States has struggled to combat the
rising threat posed by MDTOs and has had trouble securing America's
porous Southwest border.24 Today, the violence perpetrated by MDTOs
continues to grow and spill over into the United States. The influence of
MDTOs is now felt in every region of the United States. 25 According to
the National Drug Intelligence Center, MDTOs were operating in more
than one thousand U.S. cities in every region of the country in 2009 and
2010.26 However, a more violent threat to American citizens is the
growing relationship between MDTOs and FTOs.2 7 After the September
11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States has tightened security at
airports and ports of entry, but the country's Southwest border continues
to be a weak link in the chain. 28 Experts today are concerned that the
Southwest border has now become the greatest threat of terrorist
infiltration to the United States.2 9
Policymakers like McCaul are concerned with the diversification and
evolution of both MDTOs and FTOs. "As financial markets have become
globalized, so have opportunities for illicit groups to transact with each
other." 30 FTOs have expanded, and are now seeking funding from illicit
activities like drug-trafficking. The fear is that FTOs will use their
presence in Latin America to establish a relationship with MDTOs.
Today, experts that claim that this relationship has already been
Press Release, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Ros-Lehtinen Opening
Statement at Hearing on U.S. Security Threats in Western Hemisphere (Oct. 13, 2011),
http://archives.republicans.foreignaffairs.house.gov/news/story/?203 3.
22

23

Id.

See generally A Line in the Sand: Countering Crime, Violence and Terror at the
Southwest Border: Hearing before the Subcomm. on oversight, investigations and mgmt.,
24

112 Cong. (Nov, 2012).
Id. at 16.

25
26

Id.

27

Id. at 2.
Id. at 3.

28

A Line in the Sand: Countering Crime, Violence and Terror at the Southwest
Border: Hearing before the Subcomm. on oversight, investigations and mgmt, 112 Cong.
29

4 (Nov, 2012).
30

Hernandez, supranote 15, at 41.
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established, and that FTOs and MDTOs are already working together.31
According to DEA special agent Derek Maltz:
Drugs and terrorism coexist across the globe in a marriage of mutual
convenience. As state-sponsored terrorism has declined, these dangerous
organizations have looked far and wide for resources and revenue to
recruit, to corrupt, to train, and to strengthen their regime. Many drugtrafficking groups have stepped up to fill that revenue void.32

a.

Hezbollah's Presencein Mexico

In 2010, the Obama Administration described Hezbollah as "the
most technically capable terrorist group in the world." 3 3 Hezbollah, a
Shiite Islamist militia and political party, was designated as an FTO by
the State Department on October 8, 1997.34 The organization defines
itself primarily as a resistance movement, and it viscerally opposes what
it views as illegitimate United States and Israeli intervention in Lebanese
regional affairs.35 Until September 11, 2001, Hezbollah killed more
Americans than any other terrorist group36 and now runs one of the
largest and more complex criminal networks in the world.3 7
Hezbollah first established its presence in Latin America in the mid1980s, and has long benefitted from the loosely regulated tri-border area
of Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina. 38 Today, South America is home to
the largest Lebanese population in the world, 3 9 and Hezbollah's reach
extends beyond the tri-border area. 40 According to the Former
Ambassador to the Organization of American States, Roger Noriega,
"Hezbollah conspires with drug-trafficking networks in Mexico and

Id. at 47-50.
Id. at 49.
33
Celina B. Realuyo, The Terror-Crime Nexus Hezbollah's Global Facilitators,
PRISM, 2014, at 117, 119, http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_5l/TheTerrorCrime Nexus.pdf.
34
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism, Foreign Terrorist
Organizations (Feb. 20, 2016), http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm
[Hereinafter "Foreign Terrorist Organizations"].
35
Realuyo, supranote 33, at 118.
36
Id. at 117.
31

32

37

Id. at 121-23.

Threat to the Homeland: Iran's Extending Influence in the Western Hemisphere:
Written Testimony before the H Comm. on Homeland Security 113th Cong. 3 (July 9,
2013) (Written Testimony of Mathew Levitt, Director of Stein Program on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence).
39
Id. at 2.
40
Id.
38
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Central and South America as a means of raising and laundering funds,
sharing tactics and 'reaching out and touching' U.S. territory." 41
The Mexican government has already arrested numerous individuals
associated with Hezbollah for engaging in criminal activities in
Mexico. 42 Mr. Derek S. Maltz of the DEA, confirmed the arrest of a
Mexican national with ties to Lebanon for attempting to set up a
Hezbollah network in Mexico.4 3 Jameel Nasr, was a Hezbollah operative
entrusted with forming a Hezbollah base in Latin America to carry out
operations against Israeli and Western Targets.4 4 In September 2012,
Mexican authorities arrested three men suspected of operating a
Hezbollah cell in Mexico. Among the arrested was Rafic Mohammad
Labboun, a U.S. citizen born in Lebanon convicted for a credit card
scheme that raised $100,000 for Hezbollah.45 Labboun's partners were
both Lebanese immigrants who were participating in financing activities
in order to bail out incarcerated Hezbollah members in the United
States.46 These arrests arose obvious concerns involving Hezbollah's
attempt to solidify and strengthen its presence in Mexico.
Hezbollah has become well integrated in the area of transnational
organized crime, and gains much of its profits from illicit enterprises
such as drug trafficking.47 The FTO has worked closely with the MDTO
Los Zetas.48 Ayman Joumaa, a Hezbollah financer and leader of an
international drug trafficking and money laundering network, was
charged by the United States Department of Justice for selling 85,000
kilograms of cocaine to Los Zetas from 2005 to 2007.49 Joumaa and his
Hezbollah's Strategic Shift: HearingBefore H. Comm. of ForeignAffairs Subcomm.
on Terrorism, Non-Proiferationand Trade 113th Cong. 3 (March 20, 2012) (Testimony
of Roger F. Noriega, Ambassador), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA18/20130320
41

/100534/HHRG-113-FAl8-Wstate-NoriegaR-20130320.pdf.
42
Id. at 4.
Narcoterrorismand the Long Reach of U.S. Law Enforcement, Part II: Hearing
Before Subcomm. on Terrorism, Nonproiferation, and Trade, 112th Cong. (2011)
(Statement of Derek S. Maltz, Special Agent, DEA) https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys
43

/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg71265/html/CHRG-112hhrg71265.htm
4
45

JENNIFER L. HESTERMAN, THE TERRORIST-CRIMINAL NEXUS (CRC Press 2013).

Noriega Testimony, supra note 41, at 4.
Threat to the Homeland: Iran's Extending Influence in the Western Hemisphere:
Written Testimony before the H Comm. on Homeland Security 113th Cong. 5-6 (July 9,
2013) (Written Testimony of Mathew Levitt, Director of Stein Program on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence).
47
Rollins, supra note 1, at 20.
48
Press Release, United States Attorney's Office, U.S. Charges Alleged Lebanese
Drug Kingpin with Laundering Drug Proceeds for Mexican and Colombian Drug Cartels
46

(Dec.

13,

http://www.iustice.gov/archive/usao/vae/news/2011/12/20111213joumaanr.html).
49
Complaint at 3, United States v. Joumaa, No. 11-560 (E.D.Va. Nov 3, 2011).

2011),
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organization paid fees to Hezbollah to facilitate the transportation and
laundering of the drug trafficking proceeds.5 0 By using Hezbollah
couriers, Joumaa's organization was able to launder as much as $200
million per month. " . . . [T]he deviously creative ways that terrorist
organizations are funding themselves and moving their money . .. puts
into stark relief the nexus between narcotics trafficking and terrorism." 5
Joumma's arrest exposed the growing relationship between
Hezbollah and MDTOs, and raised concerns over the possibility of
Hezbollah using their growing relationship to exploit paths into the
United States.52 MDTOs collectively maintain control of drug and human
smuggling routes across the United States - Mexico border,53 and
authorities worry about the potential exploitation of these routes by FTOs
like Hezbollah. Department of Homeland Security Secretary, Janet
Napolitano, claimed that terrorists have already crossed the Southwest
border with the intent to harm the American people.54 Not only could
FTOs use these drug routes to smuggle supporters across the border, but
they could use the routes to smuggle " . . . materials, including uranium,
which can be safely assembled on U.S. soil into a weapon of mass
destruction." 5 5
b. Iran'sInfluence in Mexico
Policymakers have become increasingly concerned with Iran's
growing influence and activities in Latin America.56 Collaboration
between Iranian nationals and MDTOs was exemplified by the 2011
Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the United States.5 7
The foiled plot raised many red flags, and left many governmental
agencies wondering about the extent of relations between Iran and
MDTOs. U.S. Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen said, "[t]his week's
John Cisar, Narcoterrorism: How Drug Trafficking and Terrorism Intersect, 1:2 J. OF
HOMELAND AND NAT'L SEC. PERSPECTIVEs 23, 27-28 (2014).
51
Press Release, Drug Enforcement Administration, DEA News: Civil Suit Exposes
Lebanese Money Laundering Scheme for Hizballah (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.dea.gov
/pubs/pressrel/prl21511 .html.
52
See generally A Line in the Sand: Countering Crime, Violence and Terror at the
Southwest Border: Hearing before the Subcomm. on oversight, investigations and
management, 112 Cong. 2 (Nov, 2012).
50

53
54

Id.

Id. at 4.
Id. at 3.
56
Sullivan, supra note 20, at 1.
Robert W. Gallagher, Jr., Note, Collaborative Consumption: Evaluating the
Convergence Between Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime and its
Implicationsfor the NationalSecurity of the United States, 37 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.
REv. 317, 332 (2014).
5
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foiled plot contributed to the growing evidence of the potential links
between these groups and the drug cartels . . . it seems that our sworn
enemy Iran sees a potential kindred spirit in the drug cartels in
Mexico."
In July 2006, El Universal, a Mexican newspaper, exposed
intelligence from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration revealing
that members of the MDTO Sinaloa Cartel were being sent to Iran for
training.59 The newspaper claimed that the MDTO's members were
being as snipers and in the use of explosives trained by the Iranian
Revolutionary Guards. 6 0 The organization's members were traveling
from Mexico to Venezuela and then on to weekly flights to Tehran.61
Congressman Michael McCaul confirmed that "[i]n 2008 the Sinaloa
drug cartel was sending elite assassins to train on weapons and
explosives with Islamic radicals in Iran." 6 2 The Universal newspaper also
claimed that many Iranian nationals who belong to Hezbollah managed
to secure Mexican citizenship by marriages arranged by drug cartels in
the country. 63 The newspaper's findings raised concerns regarding the
close connection between Iran and deadly MDTOs.
b.

*

*65

Presence ofAl-Qaeda Affiliates in Mexico

In October 1999, al-Qaeda was designated as an FTO by the U.S.
State Department. 64 Al-Qaeda receives most of its funding from rich
donors and charities in Arab communities, and its decentralized cells and
*
*
affiliates that are involved in criminal activity as away to raise money.
Ever since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, law enforcement
agencies have speculated about al-Qaeda's interest in using Mexico as a
gateway for entry into the United States. In May 2012, the Los Angeles
58

Ros-Lehtinen, supra note 22.
59
Threat to the Homeland: Iran's Extending Influence in the Western Hemisphere:
Written Testimony before the H Comm. on Homeland Security 113th Cong. 7 (July 9,
2013) (Written Testimony of Mathew Levitt, Director of Stein Program on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence).
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Press Release, Congressman Michael McCaul, Generals Testify of Drug Cartels'
National Security Threat, Need to Secure Border (Oct. 14, 2011), https://mccaul
.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/generals-testify-of-drug-cartels-national-securitythreat-need-to-secure.
63
64

Id.
JOHN ROLLINS

&

ROSEN,

CONG. RESEARCH

SERV.,

TERRORISM AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME: SECURITY
CONSIDERATIONS
FOR
CONGRESS
27
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41004-2010.pdf.
65
Id.

R41004,

THREATS,
(Jan.

U.S.

INTERNATIONAL
POLICY,
5,

AND

2011),
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Times reported that a raid on Osama Bin Laden's compound uncovered
evidence that Osama Bin Laden was actively seeking to recruit anyone
with a Mexican passport to conduct terrorist operations.6 6 Bin Laden
knew how easily Mexican nationals could cross the border and blend into
American Society.6 7 The Department of Homeland Security has since
issued terror watches regarding possible illegal crossings into the United
States by terrorist suspects and recruiters.68 In 2010, a terror watch was
issued in response to reports from Texan authorities who warned that
members of al-Shabaab, an affiliate of al-Qaeda, were crossing the
border illegally.69
MDTOs have demonstrated their ever-evolving capabilities with the
many tunnels constructed to secure their drug trafficking routes. These
tunnels are used to transport narcotics, people, and other contraband from
Mexico into the United States. As of March 2011 there were 135 tunnels
discovered by United States law enforcement agencies. In one video,
authenticated by U.S. counterterrorism officials, an al-Qaeda recruiter
threatened to smuggle a biological weapon into the United States by
using tunnels created by MDTOs.' In the video, Kuwait terrorist,
Abdullah al-Nafisi said that the tunnels could be used to transport four
pounds of anthrax in order to kill 330,000 Americans within a single
hour.72
Another area of concern is the rapidly growing drug trafficking
business of MDTOs. Recently, MDTOs have been expanding cocaine
shipments into mainland Europe and are now using Africa as a

A Line in the Sand: Countering Crime, Violence and Terror at the Southwest
Border: Hearingbefore the Subcomm. on oversight, investigations and mgmt, 112 Cong.
6

3 (Nov, 2012).
Brian Bennett, Bin Laden Apparently Sought Operative with Valid Mexican
Passport,L. A. TIMES, May 2, 2012, http://Iatimesblogs.latimes.com/world now/2012/05
/papers-bin-laden-sought-operative-to-cross-into-us-from-mexico.html.
6
Press Release, Judiciary Committee, DHS Says Terrorists Illegally Crossing U.S.Mexico Border (May 27, 2010) (on file at http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/press-

releases?ID=1B4488C2-E90A-0624-0185-A99DFFBE45A8).
69
70

Id.
Danny E. Hughes, Violence Towards Police and Politicians in Mexico; Implications

for California Policing? 10 (March, 2012) (unpublished study) (On file with Command
College, Fullerton Police Department), http://Iib.post.ca.gov/lib-documents/cc/Class50/50
-Hughes.pdf.
71
Al Qaeda Eyes Bio Attack From Mexico, WASH. TIMES (June 3, 2009),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jun/03/al-qaeda-eyes-bio-attack-viamexico-border/?page=1.
72

JOHN ROLLINS & LIANA SUN WYLER & SETH ROSEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME: SECURITY THREATS,
U.S. POLICY, AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESS 10 & 40 (Jan. 5, 2010), https://www.

R41004,

fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41004-201 0.pdf.
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smuggling route.73 This new route comes with many concerns because it
exposes MDTOs to al-Qaeda and their affiliates operating in Africa.74
MDTOs are collaborating with al-Qaeda affiliates in the region to protect
drug shipments through the Sahara.7 5 In exchange for a fee, al-Qaeda's
affiliates in North Africa engage in schemes that assist in moving
cocaine from West Africa into Europe.76 The former chief of DEA
operations, Michael Braun, confirmed that groups like al-Qaeda and
MDTOs are already doing business and will become operational allies in
the future.

III.
a.

SHOULD MDTOS BE CLASSIFIED AS FTOs?

Purpose ofFTO Designation.

The Foreign Terrorist Organization list is a way in which the United
States identifies foreign organizations that are engaged in, support, or
facilitate terrorism throughout the world. 8 When the list was first issued
in 1997, it included 30 organizations and was designed to provide
valuable tools for stopping terrorists. There are currently 57
organizations on the FTO list. 79 The "FTO list has unique importance not
only because of the specific measures undertaken to thwart the activities
of designated groups but also because of the symbolic public role it plays
as a tool of U.S. counterterrorism policy."o

DesignatingMDTOs as FTOs

b.

A majority report by the U.S. House Committee on Homeland
Security entitled "A Line in the Sand: Countering Crime, Violence and
Terror at the Southwest Border" explored the increasing presence of
terrorist organizations in the region and their potential alliance with

73

Id. at 8.

74

Id.

7

Id. at 8.

76

PAUL REXTON KAN, CARTELS AT WAR: MEXICO'S DRUG FUELED VIOLENCE AND THE

THREAT TO

U.S. NATIONAL

SECURITY

85 (2012).

7

STEPHEN L. MALLORY, UNDERSTANDING ORGANIZED CRIME

78

Decker, supranote 13, at 1.
Foreign Terrorist Organizations, supra note 34.

79

273 (2nd ed. 2012).

8
AUDREY KURTH CRONIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32120 "THE FTO LIST" AND
CONGRESS: SANCTIONING DESIGNATED FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS 5 (Oct. 21,

2003), http://fas.org/irp/crs/RL32120.pdf [hereinafter Cronin].
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MDTOs.' The House Committee provided a clear and thorough
explanation of the threats and included recommendations on how to best
address them. One proposed recommendation that has gained traction is
the recommendation to designate MDTOs as FTOs.8 2 The reason that this
recommendation has caught the attention of policymakers is the idea that
MDTOs are no longer simply just a drug problem.8 3 Many government
officials believe that the diversification of the MDTOs and the potential
expansion and collaboration with FTOs is too big of a threat to be left
unanswered.

c.

ProposedLegislation: H.R. 1270 and H.R. 4303

Congressman Michael McCaul of Texas, the Chairman of the House
Committee on Homeland Security, introduced legislation seeking to
specifically designate six MDTOs as FTOs.8 4 The two bills introduced,
H.R. 1270 and H.R. 4303, cite MDTO's use of brutal tactics of violence
against United States citizens to protect and expand their drug trade and
areas of operation.15 A designation would allow federal charges to be
brought against those who provide material support or resources to
FTOs, permit deportation of FTO members, and require banks to freeze
funds tied to FTOs.8 6 McCaul defended the two bills by saying that,
"Mexican drug cartels are terrorist organizations and this designation
will provide the necessary tools to effectively advance the national
security interests of both Mexico and the United States.", 7
d.

Statutory Criteriafor an FTO Designation.

The United States has come up with a concrete standard for
determining whether an organization can be designated as an FTO. The
1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which amends
Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, sets out the legal
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Southwest Border: Hearingbefore the Subcomm. on oversight, investigations and mgmt,
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requirements for an FTO designation. Pursuant to the Act, the Secretary
of State is authorized to designate an organization as an FTO if three
elements are satisfied: (1) The organization is foreign; (2) The
organization engages in terrorist activity, terrorism, or retains the
capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism; and (3)
The terrorist activity or terrorism threatens the security of United States
citizens or the national security of the United States.89
The Secretary of State will review classified and open source
information to decide if the organization meets the required criteria for
designation. If the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney
General and the Secretary of the Treasury, decides to make the FTO
designation, he or she may add it to the FTO list by informing Congress
and publishing a notice in the Federal Register.90 Once an organization is
placed on the FTO list, the organization is subject to various financial an
immigration sanctions. 9

e.

FTO designation as applied to MDTOs

The Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, contains three
elements that must be satisfied in order for an FTO designation to take
place. 9 2 The first element required for an FTO designation is that the
organization be foreign. 9 3 Both H.R. 1270 and H.R.4303 propose to
designate the following six MDTOs as FTOs: The Arellano Feliz
Organization, The Los Zetas Cartel, The Beltran Leyva Organization, La
Familia Michoacana, The Sinaloa Cartel, The Gulf Cartel/New
Federation. 94 All of the six MDTOs proposed for designation by the two
bills are based in Mexico, and they easily satisfy the foreign requirement.
The second element required for FTO designation is that "the
organization engages in terrorist activity (as defined in Section
11 82(a)(3)(B) of [Title 8] or terrorism (as defined in section 2656f(d)(2)
of Title 22) or retains the capability and intent to engage in terrorist
activity or terrorism." 9 5 The FTO designation statute provides reference
to two other statutes to decide whether the organization is engaging in
"Terrorism" or "Terrorist Activity." 96 Under the relevant statute,
"Terrorism" is defined as "premeditated, politically motivated violence
88
89
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perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or
clandestine agents."97 In August 2010, President Calderon described the
violence perpetrated by MDTOs as "a challenge to the state, an attempt
to replace the state." 98 During that time, there were 13 political
assassinations, and over 40 journalists were murdered or disappeared. 99
Whether MDTOs are politically motivated is a heavily debated issue.' 00
Regardless, the FTO designation statute provides a disjunctive test and
the second element may still be satisfied without having to answer the
question of whether MDTOs are politically motivated.'o'
The FTO designation statute1 0 2 allows the second element to be
satisfied if the organization engages in "Terrorist Activity" as defined
under the relevant statute.1 03 The "Terrorist Activity" definition under the
relevant statute lacks a political motivation requirement.1 0 4 It is defined
as any unlawful activity which involves, among other things, " the
seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or continue to detain,
another individual in order to compel a third person (including a
governmental organization) to do or abstain from doing any act as an
explicit or implicit condition for the release of the individual seized or
detained."' 0 5 The definition also includes a violent attack upon an
internationally protected person and even includes assassinations.1 0 6
Based on this definition, the kidnappings and assassinations conducted
by MDTOs qualify as "Terrorist Activity" under the statute. MDTOs are
diversifying and they are no longer only trafficking illegal narcotics.
Today, the tactics used by MDTO's include kidnappings, beheadings,
public hanging of corpses, killing innocent bystanders, 0 7 car bombs,
torture, and assassinations of numerous journalists and government
officials.'s The surge in violence has been accompanied by an increase

97
98
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in kidnapping for ransom and other crimes that surely fit the "Terrorist
Activity" definition.' 09
Even if MDTO activity did not qualify as "Terrorist Activity" under
the relevant statute, the second criterion of the FTO designation statute
may also be satisfied if the organization "retains the capability and intent
to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism.""o Experts claim that
MDTOS have better weapons and armor than both Mexican and U.S. law
enforcement."' Combined, MDTOs have over 100,000 foot soldiers, and
have greatly upgraded their violence techniques.1 2 The organizations
now have access to military grade weaponry and homemade armored
vehicles.11 3 Dangerous MDTOs like Los Zetas continue to recruit former
military members and even corrupt police officers to fight with them."14
The "occasional use of car bombs, grenades, and rocket-propelled
grenade launchers-such as the one used to bring down a Mexican army
helicopter in May 2015 . . . continue to raise concerns that some
[MDTOs] may be adopting ... terrorist techniques"" 5 The combination
of actual violence already perpetrated by MDTOs and the vast potential
for future violence are enough to satisfy the second element required for
FTO designation.
Under the FTO designation statute, the third element that must be
satisfied for an FTO designation is that "the terrorist activity or terrorism
of the organization threatens the security of United States nationals or the
national security of the United States."1 6 Today, MDTOs are a direct
threat to American lives. "Over 200 United States citizens have been
killed in the drug war, either because they were in in the cartels or were
innocent bystanders."" 7 MDTOs also threaten the lives of American
officials. For instance, assaults on border patrol agents increased from
729 in 2006 to 1,039 in 2011." On February 15, 2011, the MDTO Los
Zetas attacked and killed United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement agent Jamie Zapata, and wounded a second agent, Victor
Avila." 9 "When Americans at home and abroad, including agents
109
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110
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assigned to protect United States borders and national security, are
targeted, threatened, and attacked by such foreign entities, it threatens the
safety and security of the United States and its people."1 20
Accordingly, MDTOs could be designated as FTOs under the
Immigration and Nationality Act. Although MDTOs meet all of the
criteria required by the FTO designation statute, this does not mean that
they should be designated as FTOs. The FTO designation statute
provides a discretionary standard, and it is up to the Secretary of State to
decide whether to designate an organization or not. All of the terrorist
organizations on the FTO list have a history of violent acts that have
killed civilians, but not all groups that kill civilians are automatically
added to the list.12' There are over 600 known terrorist groups in the
world, and not all of them make the FTO list. There are a variety of nonstatutory factors that influence the Secretary of State's decision.
Although the Secretary of State has never publicly identified any of the
non-statutory factors that influence the FTO designation decision, a
balancing of national security interests must take place.1 22

f

Arguments for Designationof MDTOs as FTOs

Policymakers like McCaul argue that an FTO designation is
necessary to prevent MDTOs from collaborating with FTOs.1 23 McCaul
argues that a designation is essential because Mexico " . . . is in danger of
becoming a failed state controlled by criminals. If this happens, Mexico
could become a safe heaven for terrorists who we know are attempting to
enter the United States through our porous border."1 24 MDTOs are
increasing their efforts to control the drug distribution networks, and the
fear is that the violent methods used by Mexican gangs and the ability of
these gangs to inconspicuously move people across the Southern border
could be exploited by terrorists.1 2 5 MDTOs and FTOs are both seeking to
120
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exploit the narcotics trade and both organizations are becoming
increasingly difficult to distinguish. According to the former DEA
operations chief:
These bad guys (MDTOs) are now routinely coming in very close
contact with the likes of Hezbollah, Hamas, Al Qaeda, who are vying for
the same money, the same turf and same dollars . .. And my point being
is, if anyone thinks for a moment that Hezbollah and Qods Force, the
masters at leveraging and exploiting existing illicit infrastructures
globally, are not going to focus on our southwest border and use that as
perhaps a spring board in attacking our country, then they just don't
understand how the real underwork.1 26
Policymakers like McCaul are critics of the United States' current
counterterrorism efforts and claim that current policies fail to look
forward to future and developing threats.1 2 7 These critics complain that
the threats posed by MDTOs are being handled improperly because they
are not being classified within the framework of national security.1 28 The
solution proposed is to classify MDTOS using the definitions of
terrorism and designating them as FTOs.
MDTOs Should not be Designatedas FTOs.
The United States should not pass legislation seeking to designate
MDTOs as FTOs. In both of McCaul's proposals, H.R. 1270 and H.R.
4303, he fails to recognize legislation already in place and presents only
one solution to a two-issue problem. He and other policymakers are
grouping together two separate and distinct emerging threats in Mexico:
the growth and expansion of MDTOs and the possibility of MDTO
members aiding FTOs. The mischaracterization of the threats has led
policymakers to believe that a single solution (designating MDTOs as
FTOs) is appropriate.
A designation of MDTOs as FTOs could lead to over-enforcement
and abuse of the discretionary powers granted to officials by an FTO
designation. There are already laws in place to deal with the issues
presented in Mexico. MDTOs are already being sanctioned under the
Kingpin Act, and MDTO members can also be prosecuted under federal
terrorist provisions under Title 21 of the U.S. Code for aiding terrorist
organizations. Consequently, an FTO designation would cause an
g.
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unnecessary overexpansion of law enforcement powers. Proponents of
the designation argue that more government agency tools are helpful.1 29
However, policymakers should be careful not to over-expand the
government agency toolbox. "Ifhistory has taught anything, it is that law
enforcement agencies will use the tools they are given, even when those
actions infringe civil liberties or belie wise policy." 30
Both domestic and international law provide the United States with a
surplus of options to deal with terrorists, specifically the option to use of
force.' 3 ' A designation of MDTOs as FTOs could provide the United
States with justification to use force against the MDTOs, and this could
have devastating implications in Mexico. "The speed of transformation
of U.S. government agencies into paramilitary institutions would likely
be accelerated by an FTO designation."1 3 2 Law enforcement agencies use
the tools that the law provides in order to pursue the targets that the
designation assigns.13 Today, drones are already flying over Mexican
airspace on a variety of surveillance missions. 3 4 "Given that some of
these drone surveillance missions already navigate into Mexico, it is not
hard to imagine these same drones being fitted with weaponry to take out
MDTO kingpins ...
An FTO designation of MDTOs would also negatively impact Fourth
Amendment protections.136 Police and other law enforcement officials
would potentially be able to conduct suspicionless searches and enjoy the
same broad discretion that many border officials possess. 17 Although the
threat of these suspicionless searches would likely apply across all
demographics, it would most likely have a discriminatory impact on
Mexican nationals.' 38 "The presumption would either be that they have

129
130
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direct ties to an MDTO or are indirectly connected via a street gang with
ties to an MDTO." 139
Labeling MDTOs as terrorists could put a strain on relations between
the United States and Mexico because the Mexican government has not
labeled MDTOs as terrorist groups.1 4 0 "If the United States labeled
[MDTOs] as terrorists without and agreement from Mexico, it would
represent a step beyond where the Mexican Government may be willing
to go." 141 The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Internal
Narcotics Law Enforcement Affairs, Brian A. Nichols, confirmed that an
FTO designation would have profound political implications, and would
require support from all Mexican counterparts.1 42
Finally, designating MDTOs as FTOs could harm many American
citizens that are consumers of MDTO's products. Drug dealers and drug
users in the United States would be exposed to prosecution under the
FTO material support statues.143 Simply put, a designation would mean
that almost all drug crimes would be transformed into terrorist crimes.
Mexico's Ambassador to the United States, Arturo Sarukhan,
commented on the proposal to label MDTOs as FTOs with the following
statement:
Misunderstanding the challenge we face leads to wrong policies and
bad policy making. If you label these organizations as terrorists, you will
have to start calling drug consumers in the U.S. 'financiers of terrorist
organizations' and gun dealers 'providers of material support to
terrorists.' Otherwise, you really sound as if you want to have your cake
and eat it too.1 44

IV.
a.

SUGGESTIONS

Correctly Defining the Threat.

There are currently two separate national security threats emerging in
Mexico. An effective solution requires an acknowledgement of the two
distinct threats, and a comprehensive plan that seeks to address both of
139

See Id.

140

Kan, supra note 76, at 138.

141

Id.

The U.S. Homeland Security Role in the Mexican War Against Drug Cartels:
Hearing Before H. Subcomm. on Oversight, Investigations, and Management, 112th
Cong. 49 (2011) (Statement of Brian Nichols), http://www.danielhudsondefense.com
/reports/DHS-war-against-drug-cartels.pdf
143
Carrie F. Cordero, Breaking the Mexican Cartels: a Key Homeland Security
Challengefor the Next Four Years, 81 UMKC L. REv. 286, 308 (2012).
144 Hesterman, supra note 44, at 159.
142

144

U. MIAMI NAT'L SECURITY & ARMED CONFLICT L. REV

[Vol. VI: 125

them. The first emerging threat, is the growth and expansion of MDTOs.
Today, MDTOs "operate nearly seamlessly across borders in order to
facilitate their operations in the most efficient manner possible."1 4 5
MDTO's increased use of brutal tactics endanger the lives of Mexican
nationals and American citizens, and contribute to the growing instability
of Mexico and the United States' Southwest border.1 4 6 American
lawmakers have acknowledged that the growth of MDTOs is now a
direct threat to the national security of the United States.1 4 7 The solution
to this threat is not to enact new legislation, but to attack MDTO finances
under the Kingpin Act. Blocking the finances of MDTOs will help
United States security forces disrupt and dismantle these deadly
organizations.
The second emerging national security threat in Mexico is the
possibility of MDTO members providing support to FTOs. The
globalization of the financial markets has provided MDTOs and FTOs
opportunities to transact with one another.1 48 Today, there are
policymakers who claim that MDTOs and FTOs have formed a strategic
alliance and work closely together.1 4 9 While a strategic alliance is
conceivable, there is no real evidence that it has actually been
achieved.15 0 "Although illicit markets have certainly become a point of
contact for otherwise vastly different criminal group-one where political
terrorism, theocratic ultra-nationalism, and narco-insurgency fund and
equip
each
other-commerce
and imitation
do
not make
amalgamation.",15s' A potential transactional relationship between
MDTOs and FTOs does not equate to a strategic alliance.1 52 Strategic
alliance or not, however, the possibility of a transactional relationship
between MDTOs and FTOs warrants attention. 15 Accordingly, in order
to prevent any transactional relationship from forming, and to ensure that
MDTOs do not support FTOs, the United States needs to better enforce
existing counterterrorism laws under Title 21 of the U.S. Code.
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perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or
clandestine agents."97 In August 2010, President Calderon described the
violence perpetrated by MDTOs as "a challenge to the state, an attempt
to replace the state." 98 During that time, there were 13 political
assassinations, and over 40 journalists were murdered or disappeared. 99
Whether MDTOs are politically motivated is a heavily debated issue.' 00
Regardless, the FTO designation statute provides a disjunctive test and
the second element may still be satisfied without having to answer the
question of whether MDTOs are politically motivated.'o'
The FTO designation statute1 0 2 allows the second element to be
satisfied if the organization engages in "Terrorist Activity" as defined
under the relevant statute.1 03 The "Terrorist Activity" definition under the
relevant statute lacks a political motivation requirement.1 0 4 It is defined
as any unlawful activity which involves, among other things, " the
seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or continue to detain,
another individual in order to compel a third person (including a
governmental organization) to do or abstain from doing any act as an
explicit or implicit condition for the release of the individual seized or
detained."' 0 5 The definition also includes a violent attack upon an
internationally protected person and even includes assassinations.1 0 6
Based on this definition, the kidnappings and assassinations conducted
by MDTOs qualify as "Terrorist Activity" under the statute. MDTOs are
diversifying and they are no longer only trafficking illegal narcotics.
Today, the tactics used by MDTO's include kidnappings, beheadings,
public hanging of corpses, killing innocent bystanders, 0 7 car bombs,
torture, and assassinations of numerous journalists and government
officials.'s The surge in violence has been accompanied by an increase

97
98
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them. The first emerging threat, is the growth and expansion of MDTOs.
Today, MDTOs "operate nearly seamlessly across borders in order to
facilitate their operations in the most efficient manner possible."1 4 5
MDTO's increased use of brutal tactics endanger the lives of Mexican
nationals and American citizens, and contribute to the growing instability
of Mexico and the United States' Southwest border.1 4 6 American
lawmakers have acknowledged that the growth of MDTOs is now a
direct threat to the national security of the United States.1 4 7 The solution
to this threat is not to enact new legislation, but to attack MDTO finances
under the Kingpin Act. Blocking the finances of MDTOs will help
United States security forces disrupt and dismantle these deadly
organizations.
The second emerging national security threat in Mexico is the
possibility of MDTO members providing support to FTOs. The
globalization of the financial markets has provided MDTOs and FTOs
opportunities to transact with one another.1 48 Today, there are
policymakers who claim that MDTOs and FTOs have formed a strategic
alliance and work closely together.1 4 9 While a strategic alliance is
conceivable, there is no real evidence that it has actually been
achieved.15 0 "Although illicit markets have certainly become a point of
contact for otherwise vastly different criminal group-one where political
terrorism, theocratic ultra-nationalism, and narco-insurgency fund and
equip
each
other-commerce
and imitation
do
not make
amalgamation.",15s' A potential transactional relationship between
MDTOs and FTOs does not equate to a strategic alliance.1 52 Strategic
alliance or not, however, the possibility of a transactional relationship
between MDTOs and FTOs warrants attention. 15 Accordingly, in order
to prevent any transactional relationship from forming, and to ensure that
MDTOs do not support FTOs, the United States needs to better enforce
existing counterterrorism laws under Title 21 of the U.S. Code.
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The Kingpin Act

b.

Policymakers like McCaul are right to worry about a potential threat,
but wrong to seek to implement new legislation, 154 instead of effectively
using existing laws, to address it. McCaul introduced legislation seeking
to classify MDTOs as FTOs as a way for the United State's to limit
MDTO's financial and property interests. 55 Although an FTO
designation does impose substantial sanctions, the proposal fails to
consider the financial sanctions that are already in place by the Treasury
Department for drug trafficking under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin
Designation Act. The six MDTOs proposed for FTO designation by H.R.
1270 and H.R. 4303, are already being heavily sanctioned under the
Kingpin Designation Act.1 56
On December 3, 1999, the President signed the Foreign Narcotics
Kingpin Designation Act in order to apply economic and other financial
sanctions to foreign narcotics traffickers and their organizations
worldwide. 5 7 The Act is administered by the Department of the
Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control. 5 Pursuant to the Act, the
President, after consulting with various federal agencies, is required to
submit to Congress an annual list identifying significant foreign narcotics
traffickers.1 59 The Kingpin Act also applies to foreign persons who are
determined to be:
(1) Materially assisting in, or providing financial or
technological support for or to, or providing goods or
services in support of, the international narcotics
trafficking activities of a person named pursuant to the
Kingpin Act;
(2) owned, controlled, directed by, or acting for or on
behalf of, a person named pursuant to the Kingpin Act;
or
(3) playing a significant role in international narcotics
trafficking.1 60
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in kidnapping for ransom and other crimes that surely fit the "Terrorist
Activity" definition.' 09
Even if MDTO activity did not qualify as "Terrorist Activity" under
the relevant statute, the second criterion of the FTO designation statute
may also be satisfied if the organization "retains the capability and intent
to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism.""o Experts claim that
MDTOS have better weapons and armor than both Mexican and U.S. law
enforcement."' Combined, MDTOs have over 100,000 foot soldiers, and
have greatly upgraded their violence techniques.1 2 The organizations
now have access to military grade weaponry and homemade armored
vehicles.11 3 Dangerous MDTOs like Los Zetas continue to recruit former
military members and even corrupt police officers to fight with them."14
The "occasional use of car bombs, grenades, and rocket-propelled
grenade launchers-such as the one used to bring down a Mexican army
helicopter in May 2015 . . . continue to raise concerns that some
[MDTOs] may be adopting ... terrorist techniques"" 5 The combination
of actual violence already perpetrated by MDTOs and the vast potential
for future violence are enough to satisfy the second element required for
FTO designation.
Under the FTO designation statute, the third element that must be
satisfied for an FTO designation is that "the terrorist activity or terrorism
of the organization threatens the security of United States nationals or the
national security of the United States."1 6 Today, MDTOs are a direct
threat to American lives. "Over 200 United States citizens have been
killed in the drug war, either because they were in in the cartels or were
innocent bystanders."" 7 MDTOs also threaten the lives of American
officials. For instance, assaults on border patrol agents increased from
729 in 2006 to 1,039 in 2011." On February 15, 2011, the MDTO Los
Zetas attacked and killed United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement agent Jamie Zapata, and wounded a second agent, Victor
Avila." 9 "When Americans at home and abroad, including agents
109
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assigned to protect United States borders and national security, are
targeted, threatened, and attacked by such foreign entities, it threatens the
safety and security of the United States and its people."1 20
Accordingly, MDTOs could be designated as FTOs under the
Immigration and Nationality Act. Although MDTOs meet all of the
criteria required by the FTO designation statute, this does not mean that
they should be designated as FTOs. The FTO designation statute
provides a discretionary standard, and it is up to the Secretary of State to
decide whether to designate an organization or not. All of the terrorist
organizations on the FTO list have a history of violent acts that have
killed civilians, but not all groups that kill civilians are automatically
added to the list.12' There are over 600 known terrorist groups in the
world, and not all of them make the FTO list. There are a variety of nonstatutory factors that influence the Secretary of State's decision.
Although the Secretary of State has never publicly identified any of the
non-statutory factors that influence the FTO designation decision, a
balancing of national security interests must take place.1 22

f

Arguments for Designationof MDTOs as FTOs

Policymakers like McCaul argue that an FTO designation is
necessary to prevent MDTOs from collaborating with FTOs.1 23 McCaul
argues that a designation is essential because Mexico " . . . is in danger of
becoming a failed state controlled by criminals. If this happens, Mexico
could become a safe heaven for terrorists who we know are attempting to
enter the United States through our porous border."1 24 MDTOs are
increasing their efforts to control the drug distribution networks, and the
fear is that the violent methods used by Mexican gangs and the ability of
these gangs to inconspicuously move people across the Southern border
could be exploited by terrorists.1 2 5 MDTOs and FTOs are both seeking to
120
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exploit the narcotics trade and both organizations are becoming
increasingly difficult to distinguish. According to the former DEA
operations chief:
These bad guys (MDTOs) are now routinely coming in very close
contact with the likes of Hezbollah, Hamas, Al Qaeda, who are vying for
the same money, the same turf and same dollars . .. And my point being
is, if anyone thinks for a moment that Hezbollah and Qods Force, the
masters at leveraging and exploiting existing illicit infrastructures
globally, are not going to focus on our southwest border and use that as
perhaps a spring board in attacking our country, then they just don't
understand how the real underwork.1 26
Policymakers like McCaul are critics of the United States' current
counterterrorism efforts and claim that current policies fail to look
forward to future and developing threats.1 2 7 These critics complain that
the threats posed by MDTOs are being handled improperly because they
are not being classified within the framework of national security.1 28 The
solution proposed is to classify MDTOS using the definitions of
terrorism and designating them as FTOs.
MDTOs Should not be Designatedas FTOs.
The United States should not pass legislation seeking to designate
MDTOs as FTOs. In both of McCaul's proposals, H.R. 1270 and H.R.
4303, he fails to recognize legislation already in place and presents only
one solution to a two-issue problem. He and other policymakers are
grouping together two separate and distinct emerging threats in Mexico:
the growth and expansion of MDTOs and the possibility of MDTO
members aiding FTOs. The mischaracterization of the threats has led
policymakers to believe that a single solution (designating MDTOs as
FTOs) is appropriate.
A designation of MDTOs as FTOs could lead to over-enforcement
and abuse of the discretionary powers granted to officials by an FTO
designation. There are already laws in place to deal with the issues
presented in Mexico. MDTOs are already being sanctioned under the
Kingpin Act, and MDTO members can also be prosecuted under federal
terrorist provisions under Title 21 of the U.S. Code for aiding terrorist
organizations. Consequently, an FTO designation would cause an
g.
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unnecessary overexpansion of law enforcement powers. Proponents of
the designation argue that more government agency tools are helpful.1 29
However, policymakers should be careful not to over-expand the
government agency toolbox. "Ifhistory has taught anything, it is that law
enforcement agencies will use the tools they are given, even when those
actions infringe civil liberties or belie wise policy." 30
Both domestic and international law provide the United States with a
surplus of options to deal with terrorists, specifically the option to use of
force.' 3 ' A designation of MDTOs as FTOs could provide the United
States with justification to use force against the MDTOs, and this could
have devastating implications in Mexico. "The speed of transformation
of U.S. government agencies into paramilitary institutions would likely
be accelerated by an FTO designation."1 3 2 Law enforcement agencies use
the tools that the law provides in order to pursue the targets that the
designation assigns.13 Today, drones are already flying over Mexican
airspace on a variety of surveillance missions. 3 4 "Given that some of
these drone surveillance missions already navigate into Mexico, it is not
hard to imagine these same drones being fitted with weaponry to take out
MDTO kingpins ...
An FTO designation of MDTOs would also negatively impact Fourth
Amendment protections.136 Police and other law enforcement officials
would potentially be able to conduct suspicionless searches and enjoy the
same broad discretion that many border officials possess. 17 Although the
threat of these suspicionless searches would likely apply across all
demographics, it would most likely have a discriminatory impact on
Mexican nationals.' 38 "The presumption would either be that they have
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direct ties to an MDTO or are indirectly connected via a street gang with
ties to an MDTO." 139
Labeling MDTOs as terrorists could put a strain on relations between
the United States and Mexico because the Mexican government has not
labeled MDTOs as terrorist groups.1 4 0 "If the United States labeled
[MDTOs] as terrorists without and agreement from Mexico, it would
represent a step beyond where the Mexican Government may be willing
to go." 141 The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Internal
Narcotics Law Enforcement Affairs, Brian A. Nichols, confirmed that an
FTO designation would have profound political implications, and would
require support from all Mexican counterparts.1 42
Finally, designating MDTOs as FTOs could harm many American
citizens that are consumers of MDTO's products. Drug dealers and drug
users in the United States would be exposed to prosecution under the
FTO material support statues.143 Simply put, a designation would mean
that almost all drug crimes would be transformed into terrorist crimes.
Mexico's Ambassador to the United States, Arturo Sarukhan,
commented on the proposal to label MDTOs as FTOs with the following
statement:
Misunderstanding the challenge we face leads to wrong policies and
bad policy making. If you label these organizations as terrorists, you will
have to start calling drug consumers in the U.S. 'financiers of terrorist
organizations' and gun dealers 'providers of material support to
terrorists.' Otherwise, you really sound as if you want to have your cake
and eat it too.1 44

IV.
a.

SUGGESTIONS

Correctly Defining the Threat.

There are currently two separate national security threats emerging in
Mexico. An effective solution requires an acknowledgement of the two
distinct threats, and a comprehensive plan that seeks to address both of
139
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them. The first emerging threat, is the growth and expansion of MDTOs.
Today, MDTOs "operate nearly seamlessly across borders in order to
facilitate their operations in the most efficient manner possible."1 4 5
MDTO's increased use of brutal tactics endanger the lives of Mexican
nationals and American citizens, and contribute to the growing instability
of Mexico and the United States' Southwest border.1 4 6 American
lawmakers have acknowledged that the growth of MDTOs is now a
direct threat to the national security of the United States.1 4 7 The solution
to this threat is not to enact new legislation, but to attack MDTO finances
under the Kingpin Act. Blocking the finances of MDTOs will help
United States security forces disrupt and dismantle these deadly
organizations.
The second emerging national security threat in Mexico is the
possibility of MDTO members providing support to FTOs. The
globalization of the financial markets has provided MDTOs and FTOs
opportunities to transact with one another.1 48 Today, there are
policymakers who claim that MDTOs and FTOs have formed a strategic
alliance and work closely together.1 4 9 While a strategic alliance is
conceivable, there is no real evidence that it has actually been
achieved.15 0 "Although illicit markets have certainly become a point of
contact for otherwise vastly different criminal group-one where political
terrorism, theocratic ultra-nationalism, and narco-insurgency fund and
equip
each
other-commerce
and imitation
do
not make
amalgamation.",15s' A potential transactional relationship between
MDTOs and FTOs does not equate to a strategic alliance.1 52 Strategic
alliance or not, however, the possibility of a transactional relationship
between MDTOs and FTOs warrants attention. 15 Accordingly, in order
to prevent any transactional relationship from forming, and to ensure that
MDTOs do not support FTOs, the United States needs to better enforce
existing counterterrorism laws under Title 21 of the U.S. Code.
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The Kingpin Act

b.

Policymakers like McCaul are right to worry about a potential threat,
but wrong to seek to implement new legislation, 154 instead of effectively
using existing laws, to address it. McCaul introduced legislation seeking
to classify MDTOs as FTOs as a way for the United State's to limit
MDTO's financial and property interests. 55 Although an FTO
designation does impose substantial sanctions, the proposal fails to
consider the financial sanctions that are already in place by the Treasury
Department for drug trafficking under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin
Designation Act. The six MDTOs proposed for FTO designation by H.R.
1270 and H.R. 4303, are already being heavily sanctioned under the
Kingpin Designation Act.1 56
On December 3, 1999, the President signed the Foreign Narcotics
Kingpin Designation Act in order to apply economic and other financial
sanctions to foreign narcotics traffickers and their organizations
worldwide. 5 7 The Act is administered by the Department of the
Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control. 5 Pursuant to the Act, the
President, after consulting with various federal agencies, is required to
submit to Congress an annual list identifying significant foreign narcotics
traffickers.1 59 The Kingpin Act also applies to foreign persons who are
determined to be:
(1) Materially assisting in, or providing financial or
technological support for or to, or providing goods or
services in support of, the international narcotics
trafficking activities of a person named pursuant to the
Kingpin Act;
(2) owned, controlled, directed by, or acting for or on
behalf of, a person named pursuant to the Kingpin Act;
or
(3) playing a significant role in international narcotics
trafficking.1 60
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The Kingpin Act blocks the assets of the named foreign narcotics
traffickers and foreign persons and prohibits U.S. persons from
conducting financial transactions with them.161
Section 805(b) of the Kingpin Act blocks all property and interests in
property within the United States, or within the possession or control of
any U.S. person, which are owned or controlled by the significant foreign
narcotics traffickers or foreign persons identified.1 62 Penalties for
violations of the act range from civil penalties of up to $1.075 million per
violation to more severe criminal penalties.1 63 Since June 2000, more
than 1,800 entities and individuals have been named pursuant to the
Kingpin Act for their role in international narcotics trafficking.1 64 The
United States government has been using the Kingpin Act to cut off the
money supply to dozens of MDTOs and their businesses. By
compromising MDTO's financial network, the United States seeks to
disable these powerful MDTOs and reduce the threat they pose.
In his testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Financial
Services and General Government, Secretary David Cohen explained
that the Treasury Department had made significant progress in its efforts
to target MDTOs.1 6 5 He explained that "[t]he Kingpin Act aims to hit
drug traffickers in their wallets, depriving them and their key lieutenants
and money launderers of access to the U.S. financial system."1 6 6 More
specifically, he spoke about how in 2013 the Department of treasury
targeted the family members and close associates of the Sinaloa Cartel
and the associates and businesses of Los Zetas.1 6 7 David Cohen's
testimony highlights the federal government's continued vigilance in its
efforts to eradicate MDTOs and their illegal drug market in the United
States.
The sanctions provided by the Kingpin act are a powerful way of
reducing MDTO's ability to operate. The Deputy Assistant Secretary,
Brian A. Nichols, described the Kingpin Act as an effective vehicle for
going after MDTOs.1 68 "It allows us to designate organizations and
161
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individuals for freezing their assets, seizing their assets, prioritizing
prosecutions, and it enjoys the full support and cooperation of the
Mexican government."1 6 9 Nichols added, "[w]e do not believe that
additional types of designation are necessary at this time." He explained
that the United States has already made "tremendous progress in going
after [MDTO's] assets, in targeting key individuals and bringing the full
force of law enforcement upon them . . .,170 The testimony by Nichols
highlights the progress of the Kingpin Act and proves that no additional
designation is required to combat the threat presented by MDTOs.

Title 21 of the U.S. Code

c.

As discussed above, the possibility of MDTO members aiding and
supporting FTOs presents a major national security threat to the United
States. Both bills, H.R. 1270 and H.R. 4303, introduced by McCaul seek
to prevent any collaboration between MDTOs and FTOs. Although it is
appropriate for policymakers like McCaul to seek to preempt any
collaboration between the two dangerous organizations, there are laws
already in place to prevent any future alliance.
While there have been a variety of isolated collaboration incidents
involving FTOs and MDTOs, there still remains no real proof that the
two organizations are working together. If MDTOs and FTOs have
formed a commercial relationship, it would be an error to confuse this
relationship with a strategic alliance.' 7 ' "Although the possibility of such
an alliance developing would be plausible, there is no conclusive
evidence of it having been consummated."1 72 According to the 2014
Country Report on Terrorism, "[t]here were no known international
terrorist organizations operating in Mexico, despite several erroneous
press reports to the contrary during 2014."173 The report explains that alQaida and Hezbollah were not confirmed in the region, but that
ideological sympathizers continue to provide financial and moral support
to those and other terrorist groups. 174 The emerging threat in Mexico
does not seem to be MDTOs working together with FTOs, but rather,
lone Mexican drug traffickers and Mexican nationals providing aid to
FTOs.
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Terrorist organizations like Hezbollah have been involved in money
laundering operations in the Western Hemisphere for at least a decade.1 5
With the large volumes of cash that MDTOs need laundered, it is natural
for policymakers to speculate over the possibility of MDTOs and FTOs
working together.1 7 6 However, MDTOs have little interests in aligning
themselves with terrorist groups. 7 7 "When terrorist organizations engage
in criminal activity, it usually is fairly apparent that crime is used as a
means to reach sociopolitical ends." 77 The goals of these terrorist groups
are ideological, and the criminal activities are normally conducted in
order to finance these ideological goals.1 7 9 In contrast, the goals of
MDTOs are primarily economic, and a potential collaboration with
hunted FTOs may be accompanied by unwanted attention.so MDTOs do
not want to overthrow and replace the Mexican government, and they do
not want to convert the Mexican people. MDTOs want to maximize their
profits and keep the government and law enforcement out of their
business.'' Just because MDTOs are unlikely to work with FTOs at an
operational level does not mean that the two groups do not have business
interests with the potential to overlap.18 2
In response to the September 11, 2001 attacks, Congress enacted the
2001 Patriot Act.' 83 The Act was reauthorized in 2005, and Congress
introduced a Narco-Terrorism statute, 21 U.S.C. §960a, as part of the the
reauthorization. 8 4 "In short, §960a criminalizes the use of drug
trafficking proceeds to finance a terrorist organization or terrorist activity
and does not require any nexus to the United States." 8 5 More
specifically, the statute prohibits persons who have engaged in certain
drug offenses from knowingly providing "anything of pecuniary value to
any person or organization that has engaged or engages in terrorist
activity ... or terrorism." 8 6 "The statute casts a wide jurisdictional net,
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allowing U.S. law enforcement to combat narco-terrorist activities

'

throughout the world." 7
"21 USC §960a allows for prosecution of terrorist-related, extraterritorial drug offenses and provides DEA with a particularly powerful
tool to prosecute, disrupt, and dismantle narco- terrorist groups
worldwide."' The statute gives the DEA jurisdiction to investigate
cases internationally if there is an established link between a drug
offense and terrorism. 8 9 In 2012, international drug dealer, Haji
Baghcho, was sentenced to life in prison for conspiring to distribute
heroin in the United States and using the proceeds of the distribution to
support the Taliban.' 90 The defendant was found guilty of violations of
numerous narco-terrorism related charges, including §960a.' 9
As state sponsorship for terrorism continues to decline, FTOs will
continue to seek new sources of funds for their terrorist activities.192
MDTOs generate over $40 billion annually, and the possibility of FTOs
seeking funding from MDTOs needs to be considered.' 93 "Drugs fuel
terrorism and economically support the very organizations America has
pledged to defeat.1 94 In order to prevent MDTO members from providing
aid to FTOs, the United States' agencies need to more effectively utilize
§960a. Under §960a, the DEA can work closely with federal prosecutors
to identify, investigate, indict and incarcerate any MDTO member who is
providing assistance to an FTO.

V. CONCLUSION
Narco-terrorism is one of the most dangerous national security
threats immediately facing the United States today. Policymakers have
proposed designating six MDTOs as FTOs as a solution to this threat.
However, this solution mischaracterized the threat and fails to recognize
helpful legislation already in place. Instead of designating MDTOs as
FTOs, the United States needs to more effectively utilize existing
narcotics trafficking regulations under the Kingpin Act, and
187
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counterterrorism laws under Title 21 of the U.S. Code to combat this
developing narco-terrorism threat.

